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Please Leave Your Constitutional Protections at the Door:
A Challenge to Louisiana's Mandatory Drug Testing Statutes
I. INTRODUCTION
The Louisiana Legislature has declared that a "state of emergency"' exists as
a result of the increase in the use of illegal drugs among Louisiana's citizens. In
response, it enacted two statutes which potentially require anyone who receives
anything of economic value from the state to produce a urine sample to be tested
for the presence of illegal drugs, or risk losing eligibility to receive those things of
economic value from the state. Subject to the testing requirements are, among
others, government employees, students who receive financial aid from the state
and welfare recipients.
In the wake of recent United States Supreme Court decisions, it is difficult to
perceive how these testing programs can survive constitutional challenges based
upon the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches. One
such challenge has already resulted in an injunction, stopping the drug testing of
elected officials.2 The Supreme Court has decided that absent either some
individualized suspicion or a significant safety risk, the government may not
subject individuals to urinalysis drug testing.3 To do so would be an invasion of
the Fourth Amendment protections of those tested. Louisiana's statutes require no
probable cause or reasonable suspicion of drug use, and only a fraction of those
who will be subjected to the testing requirements are in safety-sensitive positions.
This comment will evaluate the provisions of Louisiana's drug testing statutes,
discuss the cases in which the Supreme Court has examined similar drug testing
statutes under the Fourth Amendment, and analyze the constitutionality of
Louisiana's program in light of those Supreme Court decisions.
II. THE LOUISIANA STATUTES
In 1997, the Louisiana Legislature voted to enact a series of statutes which
would allow the state to require persons to be tested for illegal drugs. One statute
is broad, covering virtually all persons in the state,4 while the other applies
specifically to those who receive welfare benefits from the state.5
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
1. La. R.S. 49:1021(A) (Supp. 1997).
2. O'Neill v. State of Louisiana, 61 F. Supp. 2d 485 (E.D. La. 1998).
3. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997); Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct.
1402 (1989).
4. La. R.S. 49:1021 (Supp. 1997).
5. La. R.S. 46:460.10 (Supp. 1997).
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A. Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:1021
Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:10216 provides that any person who
6. 1997 La. Acts 1459, § 2.
La. R.S. 49:1021 (Supp. 1997) provides:
A. (1) The legislature does hereby declare that a state of emergency exists in Louisiana as
a result of the spiraling increases of abuse of illegal substances by its citizens. The
legislature further declares that such illegal drug abuse presents a clear and present danger
to the health, welfare, and security of the state, its citizens, and government. The legislature
acknowledges that the terrible cost of drug abuse is ultimately paid by all of the state's
citizens in the form of public monies expended to eradicate, interdict, and destroy such
illegal substances .... operate a costly and massive criminal justice system for violators and
... acknowledges that all its citizens eventually pay the high price of illegal substance abuse
by way of decreased productivity in the work place, and higher costs for goods and services
throughout the state's economic apparatus.... Children, especially from lower income
families, suffer unnecessarily from the drug abuse when they go unfed, ill clothed, and
without proper medical treatment because drug abusing adults in the household spend badly
needed money for illegal substances. Many times, the drug abusers deny themselves proper
medical treatment to obtain illegal drugs, often becoming not only ill, but indigent as well.
The legislature therefore believes that government has a compelling interest to insure,
protect, and safeguard its citizens from the scourge of illegal drug abuse, whether in the
classroom or the halls of government.
(2) Those persons entering into contracts with the state to provide goods and services,
including such items as food services, construction of roads, and other public improvements,
and goods and services provided could place in jeopardy the lives or livelihood of persons
operating motor vehicles, eating at public state facilities or receiving other goods and
services from such vendors. This would certainly involve a safety sensitive issue. Those
persons receiving loans apply for the privilege of such award of taxpayer funds based upon
claiming a special need for such assistance. It is in the state's best interest and a duty of the
state to protect the taxpayers from waste, fraud, and corruption by determining if such per-
sons receiving such funding are using the funds as stated in their applications .... The state,
therefore, has a higher duty to be sure its funds are not used to further the addiction of
someone who has the responsibility over children, elderly, or others dependent on their care.
B. The commissioner of administration shall establish and administer a program for random
drug testing for all persons who receive anything of economic value or receive funding from
the state or an entity thereof, including but not limited to all persons awarded state contracts
to provide goods or services or loans from the state or an entity thereof.
C. The commissioner of administration shall promulgate rules and regulations for
conducting a random drug testing program .... When an agency, department or other
government entity has an operational drug testing program, that agency, department, or
government entity shall randomly test all of those persons seeking contracts or loans....
E. If the sample of a person tested subject to the provisions of this Section should indicate
the presence of an illegal substance and it is the first such indication of such an illegal sub-
stance, that person shall be subject to compliance with the terms of a rehabilitative treatment
program approved by the commissioner of administration as a prerequisite to continuation
of the contract or loan from the state or an entity thereof. The costs of such a rehabilitative
treatment program will be paid by the person's health care insurer if that person has such
coverage through said health care insurer. Otherwise, the costs of the treatment shall be
bore by the person at his own expense. If the person is indigent, the program costs shall
be borne by the agency requiring the drug testing and rehabilitative treatment.
F. If a person subject to the provisions of the Section refuses to comply with a test request
or if the sample of a person tested subject to the provisions of this Section indicates the
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receives "anything of economic value" from the state or a state entity shall be
subject to the possibility of a random drug test.7 Included in this group of persons
to be tested are employees of the state, any state agency, or any entity of the state,
recipients of welfare benefits and students who receive grants, loans or
scholarships from the state to attend institutions of higher learning. The statute
provides that chemical tests will be conducted to determine the presence of illegal
substances in the body.9 Although each entity to which the statute applies is
responsible for implementing its own testing program, the most prevalent method
of conducting such a test is by urinalysis. ° The statute further provides that any
person who fits within the scope of the statute "shall be deemed to have given
consent" to a drug test." A person who tests positive for the presence of illegal
drugs must comply with the requirements of a rehabilitative treatment program,
provided that this is the first occurrence of a positive drug test result. If the person
subsequently tests positive for the presence of drugs in his body, his contract or
loan with the state or state entity will be terminated.
B. Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:460.10
The legislature adopted a similar random drug testing provision that applies
exclusively to adult recipients of public assistance.'2  By enacting Louisiana
presence of an illegal substance and it is the second or subsequent indication of such an
illegal presence or occurs during the rehabilitative treatment program, that person shall be
subject to termination, removal, or loss of the contract or loan.
G. Any person subject to the provisions of this Section shall be deemed to have given
consent to a chemical test or tests for the purpose of determining the presence in their body
of any illegal substance....
7. La. R.S. 49:1021(B) (Supp. 1997).
8. The statute, by its very broad terms, would apply to many more categories of people than
those listed. However, the Governor intends to focus the drug testing on state employees, welfare
recipients, and students who receive loans, grants, or scholarships from the state. Joe Gyan, Jr., Judge
Rules Drug-testing Law Illegal, The Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), Nov. 21, 1998, at IA.
9. La. R.S. 49:1021(G) (Supp. 1997).
10. The challenged program in the ACLU petition uses urinalysis. It is expected that other testing
will be done in much the same way.
It. La.R.S.49:1021(G)(Supp. 1997).
12. La. R.S. 46:460.10 (Supp. 1997) provides:
A. The legislature hereby reaffirms the legitimate government function of promoting the
safety and welfare of children and adults. The legislature declares that the best interests of
a significant portion of the state's population are served by ensuring that they are free of the
physical and mental impairments associated with drug dependence. The legislature further
reaffirms its compelling interest in providing safeguards to eliminate the misappropriation
of entitlement benefits. The legislature hereby directs the secretary of the Department of
Social Services in consultation with the secretary of the Department of Health and Hospitals
and the commissioner of administration to establish a mandatory drug testing program for
certain adults in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant Program.
B. The secretary of the Department of Social Services shall cause to be instituted a
mandatory drug testing program for certain adult participants, to be determined by the
secretary of the Department of Health and Hospitals and the commissioner of administra-
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Revised Statutes 46:460.10, the Louisiana Legislature amended the Welfare
Reform Act of 1995 to include a mandatory random drug testing provision. 3 The
statute provides that a mandatory drug testing program shall be instituted for
"certain adult participants... in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
Block Grant Program."' 4 Upon the first positive drug test, the participant must
complete an "education and rehabilitation program 'ts as a prerequisite for
continued benefits. 6 The welfare recipient will not suffer suspension of his
benefits while he is taking part in such a program;' 7 however, in the event of
subsequent positive drug tests, the recipient will be subject to suspension of his
entitlement to such benefits.'"
IH. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court of the United States has examined drug testing programs,
which, although similar to the ones enacted in Louisiana, applied to a much
narrower segment of the population. The Court addressed the constitutionality of
these programs under the Fourth Amendment. 9 The Fourth Amendment protects
"[tihe right of people to be secure . ..against unreasonable searches and
tion, in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant Program. No participant
shall be tested if such testing is prohibited by federal law. No sanction shall be imposed on
an adult participant of such sanction is prohibited by federal law. Such testing program
shall provide procedural safeguards to ensure the protections of the constitutional rights of
the program participants and provide that testing shall be done by state certified laboratories.
C. The required drug testing program shall require a participant to complete an education
and rehabilitation program upon the initial identification of such participant as an illegal
drug user verified by a positive test result as a prerequisite to continued receipt of benefits.
Further, the drug testing program shall provide for the suspension of participation in such
entitlement program for a participant subsequently identified by a verified positive test result
as an illegal drug user; however, in no event shall participation in such entitlement program
be suspended while the participant is taking part in the education and rehabilitation program
or until an education and rehabilitation program is available to the participant. The
secretary of the Department of Social Services in conjunction with the secretary of the
Department of Health and Hospitals and the commissioner of administration shall provide
a program of education and rehabilitation for participants so identified as illegal drug users.
Such program shall include regulations governing the reentry of a suspended recipient into
the entitlement program based on subsequent testing results and completion of education
and rehabilitation programs. Such program shall also include the provision of inpatient
services for any participant identified as an illegal drug user if it is determined that such
impatient services are necessary for successful rehabilitation .... .
13. 1997 La. Acts No. 1459, §§ 3, 4, and 5.
14. La. R.S. 46:460.10(B) (Supp. 1997).
15. La. R.S. 46:460.10(C) (Supp. 1997).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. id.
19. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997); Vemonia Sch. Dist. 471 v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989); and Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.
Ct. 1402 (1989).
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seizures.... 0 Searches have traditionally been held to be per se unreasonable
when they are conducted without a warrant.2' However, there are situations in
which it is not feasible to require a warrant, such as when there is a possibility that
a suspect will flee or when evidence might be destroyed. In such cases, courts have
required that individualized suspicion be present before a warantless search can be
conducted.22 Still other situations dictate that even individualized suspicion may
be unattainable. In some employment settings, the circumstances surrounding the
employment may preclude the type of scrutiny needed to develop suspicion of drug
use. For example, some jobs require that the employee work out of the office or
travel for an extended period of time. In such a situation, there is no opportunity
for individualized suspicion to be formed.
Such problems, along with various other obstacles, have prompted courts to
carve out a "special needs" exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. This exception applies when "special needs" beyond the normal need
for law enforcement make the warrant and probable cause requirements
impracticable. 23 The Supreme Court has recognized that a mandatory random drug
testing scheme fits within a "special need" of the government. Although some of
the programs examined by the Court passed constitutional muster, the Louisiana
statutes do not contain the stipulations required by the Court to be deemed
"reasonable."
A. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) mandated urinalysis tests to detect
drug use among employees involved in certain train accidents. The testing program
was enacted in response to evidence gathered by the FRA which showed that from
1972 to 1983, 21 train accidents occurred in which drug or alcohol use was a
contributing factor. As a result of those accidents, there were 25 fatalities, 61
injuries, and $19 million in damages. The Railway Labor Executives' Association
and members of its labor organizations brought suit in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives Association' seeking to enjoin the testing program and challenging the
scheme as a violation of Fourth Amendment protections. The Supreme Court of
the United States held that the regulations were constitutional.
The Supreme Court first recognized that because the collection and testing of
urine samples intrudes upon expectations of privacy, the intrusions are searches
and therefore invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment.' Because drug
tests are searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, they must be
reasonable. The Court held that the determination of what is reasonable under the
20. U.S. Const. art. IV.
21. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,454-55,91 S. Ct. 2022, 2032 (1971).
22. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Assoc., 489 U.S. 602,624,109 S. Ct. 1402,1417 (citing
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976)).
23. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351,105 S. Ct. 733, 748 (1985).
24. 489 U.s. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
25. Id. at 617, 109 S. Ct. at 1413.
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Fourth Amendment depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search
and upon the nature of the search itself.
The tests in Skinner were conducted without a warrant or individualized
suspicion of those tested. Instead, the tests were randomly conducted after the
occurrence of certain accidents. They were designed to meet the "special needs"
of the FRA to promote safety in the industry and to help determine the causes of
railway accidents. When faced with such a "special needs" situation, the Court
held that it must balance the governmental interests in conducting the search
against the privacy interests of the individual. It also noted that when the "special
needs" balancing is triggered, the application must be a context-specific inquiry
into each individual case.
The Court ruled that the invasion of privacy suffered by those employees
tested under the FRA program was minimal. The tests were conducted in a medical
environment under the supervision of a testing administrator who did not view the
individual while the sample was collected, but only listened for sounds of urination.
The Court also held that individuals who participate in an industry that is heavily
regulated by the government have a diminished expectation of privacy.
Furthermore, requiring particularized suspicion in this case would impede the
purpose of the regulation. "[Clompelling government interests [served by the
FRA's regulations] would be significantly hindered if railroads were required to
point to specific facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of impairment before
testing a particular employee."2
The Court also focused on the fact that not every person employed in the
railroad industry would be tested under the random drug testing provisions. The
testing was triggered by the occurrence of an accident. A key factor in upholding
the program was that those tested occupied safety-sensitive positions in the
industry. In a highly regulated industry, where the governmental interest in safety
outweighed the diminished privacy interests of individuals, the government can
constitutionally conduct drug tests without a warrant or individualized suspicion.'
B. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab
In a companion case decided on the same day as Skinner, the Supreme Court
upheld a program for random drug testing of certain employees of the United States
Customs Service. 8 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the governmental interest
in testing certain Customs Service employees outweighed the privacy interests of
those individuals protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The United States Customs Service had in place a urinalysis drug testing
program that made the test a requirement for promotion to or employment in
positions that met one or more of three criteria: 1) direct involvement in drug
interdiction or enforcement of related laws; 2) a requirement that the employee
26. Id. at 633, 109 S. Ct. at 1421-22.
27. Id. at 619, 109 S. Ct. at 1414.
28. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. at 1384 (1989).
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carry firearms; or 3) a requirement that the employee handle classified material."
The urine was to be collected in a bathroom stall while an administrator of the same
sex listened for sounds of urination, but the employee was not visually monitored.
As in Skinner, the Court observed the "special needs" of the government in
this situation. Pursuant to the application of the "special needs" exception to the
warrant requirement, the Court balanced the interests of the government against the
privacy interests of the tested employee to determine whether the search was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
As applied to drug interdiction personnel, the Court held that the governmental
interests outweighed the privacy interests of the employees. The government has
a strong interest in ensuring that drug users are not promoted to positions directly
involving the interdiction of illegal drugs. ° These persons may be subject to
bribery or their physical safety may be threatened by people entering the country
with illegal drugs, and they are often exposed to illegal substances. Therefore, the
Court noted, it is important that those occupying these positions have
"unimpeachable integrity and judgment," unimpaired by the use of illegal drugs.3
The Court likewise ruled that public interest demands that drug users not be
promoted to positions that require the employee to carry a firearm. "[The] public
should not bear the risk that employees who may suffer from impaired perception
and judgment will be promoted to positions where they may need to employ deadly
force.
32
As in Skinner, the Court pointed out that employees of the Customs Service
have a diminished expectation of privacy. "Because successful performance of
their duties depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity, these employees
cannot reasonably expect to keep from the Service personal information that bears
directly on their fitness."33 Again, emphasis was placed on the fact that there was
a triggering event that placed the employee on notice that he could be tested. In
this case, that event was the employee's application for promotion to one of the
covered positions. The Court also recognized that it would not be feasible to
require individualized suspicion in this case. The employees who would be tested
under the urinalysis program are not subject to the kind of day-to-day scrutiny
under which most office employees work.
Thus in Von Raab, the Supreme Court held that the government demonstrated
that its compelling interests in public safety outweigh the privacy interests of
employees who apply to be promoted to positions that involve the interdiction of
illegal drugs or that require the employee to carry a firearm.3 4 The Court did not
hold, however, that employees who have access to sensitive information could be
drug tested without a violation of their Fourth Amendment protections. It stated
that the reasonableness of requiring testing of these individuals would depend upon
29. Id. at 660-61, 109 S. Ct. at 1388.
30. Id. at 670, 109 S. Ct. at 1393.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 671, 109 S. Ct. 1393.
33. Id. at 672, 109 S. Ct. 1394.
34. Id. at 677, 109 S. Ct. 1396-97.
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the employees' expectations of privacy and the type of materials that would be
handled by those employees. This gives rise to the belief that as long as these
employees do not handle any information that, if released, would compromise
public safety or subject them to the possibility of bribery, they could not be
constitutionally required to undergo drug testing without implicating their Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.
C. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
In Vernonia,3" the Supreme Court applied the "special needs" balancing test
to the random drug testing of student athletes in public schools. The school district
implemented a mandatory random drug testing program to test students who
participate in interscholastic athletics in response to an observed increase in drug
use among these students.
Again, the Supreme Court utilized the balancing test to determine whether the
search was reasonable, given the "special needs" of the school district. The Court
began by examining the privacy interests implicated by the testing program. It first
noted that school-aged children lack some fundamental rights, including liberty, as
they are subject to the control of their parents. It further explained that a parent,
when he sends his child to school, delegates some of his parental authority to the
schoolmaster.36  Although it recognized that children do not "shed their
constitutional protections at the schoolhouse gate,"37 the Court nevertheless
concluded that within the school environment, students have a lesser expectation
of privacy than do free adults, illustrated by the fact that students are required to
undergo hearing and visual screening, dermatological examinations, and
vaccinations.
The Court further stated that privacy expectations of student-athletes are even
lower. These students, it reasoned, are exposed to situations in which their privacy
is diminished on a regular basis, such as changing and showering before and after
competitions and practices in a.less-than-private locker room. The Court also noted
that by choosing to participate in interscholastic athletics, the students voluntarily
subject themselves to the drug testing policy implemented by the school district.
As for the nature of the search, the Court observed that the testing environment
was not significantly different to that in a public restroom. Female student-athletes
were allowed to produce a urine sample in a bathroom stall behind a closed door,
while a monitor stood outside only to listen for sounds of tampering. Male students
were allowed to stand, fully clothed, with their backs facing a monitor, who
observed from behind. The Court viewed the privacy interests of the students
implicated by this process as "negligible."
38
35. 515 U.S. 646, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
36. Id. at654, 115 S. Ct. at 2391.
37. Id. at 655-56, 115 S. Ct. at 2392 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S. Ct. 733, 736 (1969)).
38. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 657, 115 S. Ct. at 2392-93.
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The major governmental interest to be advanced by the drug tests was to deter
drug use among schoolchildren. The Court stated that this interest a fortiori
applies to student-athletes who are exposed to the risk of immediate physical harm
every time they step on the field, and who, therefore, need to be free from the
effects of illegal drugs. Also key in the Court's analysis was the fact that student-
athletes serve as role models for the rest of the student body. The Court, therefore,
held that the school district's interests in implementing the drug testing program
clearly outweighed the "negligible" privacy interests of the student-athletes.
The Court further noted that a drug testing program based on suspicion of drug
use would be worse than a suspicionless, random drug test in this case. It reasoned
that a testing program based on individualized suspicion would place a "badge of
shame" 39 on tested students, would put teachers in an awkward position of singling
out students to be tested, and would likely result in the most troublesome students
being tested. The Court was careful, however, to "caution against the assumption
that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other
contexts."' ° Although the Court declared this suspicionless drug testing program
constitutional, it was careful to point out that a key factor in this case was that the
school was acting as guardian and tutor of the students, and therefore was allowed
to minimally invade the privacy of the students.
D. Chandler v. Miller
In its most recent examination of a random mandatory drug testing scheme, the
Supreme Court in Chandler v. Miller" struck down a program which required
candidates for certain elected public offices to undergo urinalysis testing before the
election, stating that those testing programs did not fit within the "closely guarded
category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches." 2
The Georgia statute in this case required the candidate to produce a urine
sample in an environment that was even less intrusive than those involved in
Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia. The candidate was allowed to use his personal
physician to fulfill the testing requirements. Furthermore, the results of the test
were submitted directly to the candidate and were not released to the public or state
officials unless the candidate decided to disclose the information.
In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of
appeals and held the search to be unreasonable under a Fourth Amendment "special
needs" analysis. Although the Court here acknowledged that the invasiveness of
the testing procedure was effectively limited, it stated that the special need offered
by the government must still be "important enough to override the individual's
acknowledged privacy interest, [and] sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth
Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion."' 3
39. Id. at 663, 115 S. Ct. at 2395-96.
40. Id. at 665, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.
41. 520 U.S. 305, 117S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
42. Id. at 309, 117 S. Ct. 1298.
43. Id. at 318, 117 S. Ct. at 1303.
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The Court specifically pointed out that the government's argument for
upholding the statute was lacking "any indication of a concrete danger demanding
departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule."" It noted that there was no
evidence presented of a drug problem among Georgia's elected officials. Key in
the Court's analysis of the testing program was that the officials who would be
subjected to the urinalysis requirement did not perform any high-risk or safety-
sensitive tasks. The Court further recognized that state officials are scrutinized
every day and therefore, it would not be impractical to require individualized
suspicion before testing could be conducted. It held that the need urged by the
government in this case is merely symbolic, not special.
The Court stressed that Von Raab must be read in its unique context. It urged
that a "need of the 'set a good example' genre" is insufficient to overcome a Fourth
Amendment objection.45 The Court concluded that "where, as in this case, public
safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes suspicionless
searches, no matter how conveniently arranged.""
IV. ANALYSIS-APPLYING FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS TO THE
LOUISIANA STATUTES
The urinalysis testing to be implemented by Louisiana Revised Statutes
49:1021 and 46:460.10 is to be conducted randomly without a warrant. The drug
testing program is intended to be justified as a "special needs" type program of the
sort that was considered in the Supreme Court cases discussed above. The legisla-
ture has not articulated any process whereby individualized suspicion will be used
to determine which persons will be tested, nor has it given any indication that it
would not be feasible to require individualized suspicion. Instead, it has simply
stated that such testing programs are to be imposed upon any person who receives
anything of economic value from the state or an entity thereof based upon the
effects that illegal drug use has upon the government, as well as the citizens of
Louisiana.4' Therefore, consistent with the Supreme Court cases, a court consider-
ing a constitutional challenge to the Louisiana statutes would be required to balance
the government's interests in conducting the testing program against the privacy in-
terests of the individual implicated by being subjected to a urinalysis examination.
A. The First Challenge-O'Neill v. State of Louisiana
The first challenge to Louisiana's drug testing statutes was brought by the
American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of a justice of the peace and a Louisiana
State Representative, asking the court to enjoin the testing of elected officials
pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 42:1116.1. Like the testing provisions
44. Id. at 318-19, 117 S. Ct. at 1303.
45. Id. at 322, 117 S. Ct. at 1305.
46. Id. at 323, 117 S. Ct. at 1305.
47. La. R.S. 49:1021(B) (Supp. 1997).
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discussed, the statute challenged in O'Neill v. State of Louisiana,4 allowed the
testing to be conducted "without the necessity of showing any measure of
individualized suspicion."'49 Citing Skinner, Von Raab, Vernonia, and Chandler,
the court held that the drug testing statute violated the Fourth Amendment.
The court stated that deciding whether a suspicionless drug test is a reasonable
search is a two step process. First, the court must determine whether any "special
needs" of the government exist. If, and only if, the government can show "special
needs" to conduct the test, then the court can proceed to the second step, balancing
public versus private interests.'" In this case, the court never got to the second step,
because it held that the government had not met its burden of proving "special
needs."
The court recognized that the state had not offered any real evidence to prove
that drug abuse among Louisiana's elected officials was anything more than
hypothetical. Further, following, the Supreme Court's opinion in Chandler, the
court held that elected officials do not occupy any safety-sensitive positions within
society. The court also noted that although elected officials are often in the public
eye, it does not automatically follow that they have a diminished expectation of
privacy. Finally, it concluded that the purpose of the statute is only symbolic, and
in the wake of Chandler, searches conducted pursuant to such a statute are clearly
unconstitutional. Because no "special needs" existed for the testing of elected
officials, the court issued an injunction against the drug testing of Louisiana's
elected officials.5
The decision in O'Neill does not extend beyond its application to elected
officials. Therefore, it is still necessary to examine the constitutionality of
Louisiana's drug testing statutes as applied to other persons covered under their
provisions. O'Neill, however, can provide persuasive support for successful
challenges to Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:1021 and 46:460.10. Following
United States Supreme Court precedent and the well-reasoned decision in O'Neill,
courts should invalidate other provisions of Louisiana's broad drug testing scheme,
as well.
B. Constitutional Infirmities of Louisiana's Drug Testing Statutes
1. Overbreadth and Vagueness
The first defect in Louisiana's drug testing plan is that it is far too broad and
overreaching in its application to those persons who may be tested. Skinner
48. 61 F. Supp. 2d 485 (E. D. La. 1998).
49. La. R.S. 42:1116.1(A) (Supp. 1997).
50. O'Neill at 496-97.
51. Officials for the State of Louisiana have stated that they intend to appeal this court's ruling
to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. However, because the law is so clearly stated in prior Supreme
Court jurisprudence, it is unlikely that the District Court's ruling will be reversed. See Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.
Ct. 2386 (1995); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384
(1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
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expressly stated that each time a "special needs" evaluation is done, a context-
specific inquiry is required."2 In enacting these statutes, the legislature has given
no indication that such an inquiry was conducted. The statute simply states that a
"state of emergency exists in the State of Louisiana" which justifies drug testing
of Louisiana citizens.53 It subjects to testing anyone who receives anything of
economic value from the state or any state entity.54
Because the statute applies to any person who receives "anything of economic
value or receive[s] funding from the state or an entity thereof,"55 conceivably, this
urinalysis program could be imposed upon any person living in the State of
Louisiana and perhaps even some persons who may merely be present within the
state, but who do not reside in Louisiana. In some sense, nearly every person living
in or visiting Louisiana receives something of economic value from the state or a
state entity. All persons who drive cars in the state benefit from the use of
Louisiana's roads and highways. Anyone who lives inside of the State of
Louisiana, or anyone who visits the state, is protected by the police and fire
departments, which are sub-divisions of state entities. Every child who attends
public school receives an education that is funded by the state. Therefore, under
the provisions of the statutes currently in effect in Louisiana, any person who steps
foot inside Louisiana's borders could potentially be forced to undergo a urinalysis
test. Is this the result that the legislature was trying to reach by enacting such a
broad statute? If so, it is impossible for such a sweeping provision to be upheld
against a constitutional challenge.
The statute is not only overly broad in its scope, it is also impermissibly vague.
Louisiana courts have held that "a law is fatally vague... if the law does not
provide a standard to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory application." ' The
statute mandating drug testing does not articulate any standard by which those
tested will be selected. There is nothing to prevent arbitrary selection of those to
be tested. While the statutes require that each state department, agency, or entity
devise its own program for drug testing, the statutes themselves give no guidelines
as to how to select those who will be tested. In fact, in the case of welfare
recipients, Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:460.10(B) simply states that "certain
adult participants" will be tested, giving no indication which recipients will be
considered "certain adult participants."57
52. Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 619, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989).
53. La. R.S. 49:1021(A) (Supp. 1997).
54. La. R.S. 49:1021(B) (Supp. 1997).
55. Id.
56. Intense Health Care v. Gore, 719 So. 2d 682, 685 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998) (citing Med
Express Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Evangeline Parish Police Jury, 684 So. 2d 359 (La. 1996) (citing
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,497-500,102 S. Ct. 1186,
1193 (1982))).
57. La. R.S. 46:460.10(B) (Supp. 1997).
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2. Lack of Consent to Search
Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:1021(G) specifically states that "[a]ny person
subject to the provisions of this Section shall be deemed to have given consent" to
being tested for the presence of illegal drugs in his body. Based on this language
in the statute, the state may argue that by receiving anything of economic value
from the state, persons implicitly consent to drug testing. However, this argument
cannot pass constitutional scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has held that when consent is given to search without a
warrant, that consent must be given freely and voluntarily." Additionally, when
the consent is relied on to establish the reasonableness of a search, the state must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the consent was given freely and
voluntarily.59
Persons from out of state who enter into contracts with the State of Louisiana,
or visitors traveling on Louisiana's roads and highways, are probably not even
aware of the drug testing statutes enacted in Louisiana. Therefore, it cannot be said
that by simply doing these activities, and thus receiving things of economic value
from the state, that they are voluntarily consenting to being tested for drugs.
Although ignorance of the law is usually note a valid defense, a person's Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches may only be waived if
such waiver is voluntary.' It can hardly be stated that the crossing of a border into
Louisiana is a voluntary waiver of one's Fourth Amendment rights.
The same rationale applies to persons who receive welfare or unemployment
benefits from the state. It cannot be assumed that people who receive these
benefits voluntarily choose to be placed on the welfare or unemployment rolls. For
many of these people, it is their only means of survival while they are unemployed
or underpaid. Such circumstances cannot in any way be deemed as "freely" giving
consent to a drug test. The state cannot condition the survival of these people upon
their consenting to be tested for drugs.
Moreover, government employees may not be required, as a condition of
employment, to waive a constitutional right.6 The state cannot, therefore, deem
that a person, by receiving things of economic value from the state, has
relinquished his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The argument that Louisiana's drug testing procedures are performed
pursuant to the consent of state employees cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.
Regarding the application of the drug testing stautes to students who receive
financial aid, it has previously been held that "[t]he state, in operating a public
school system of higher education, cannot condition attendance at one of its
schools on the student's renunciation of his constitutional rights."62 Most of the
58. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973).
59. State v. Ford, 713 So, 2d 1214 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998).
60. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218,93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973).
61. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 US. 563 at 567-68, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1734 (1968).
62. Devers v. Southern Univ., 712 So. 2d 199, 206 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998) (citing Robinson v.
Board of Regents of E. Kentucky Univ., 475 F.2d 707, 709 (6th Cir. 1973).
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students in Louisiana who receive financial aid could not attend college without
that funding. The legislature is conditioning their ability to receive funding, and
therefore to attend college, upon consent to conduct an unreasonable search. This
cannot be done without infringing upon the constitutional rights of the student.
The legislature cannot require a student to waive his constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches so that he may further his education.
3. Lack of "Special Needs"
a. Individualized Suspicion
The Louisiana Legislature enacted the drug testing statutes at the insistence of
the governor, who urged that Louisiana needed some sort of system to combat the
problem of drug abuse in the state. Specifically, the governor wanted to target
three groups of individuals-government employees, students who receive
financial assistance from the state, and welfare recipients. 3
As ajustification for implementing the drug-testing programs, the legislature
declared that a "state of emergency" exists in Louisiana as a result of increases in
drug abuse among its citizens." However, the legislature has offered no evidence
of the extent of illegal drug use among those covered by the statute.
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently examined a drug
testing policy applied to government employees. In United Teachers of New
Orleans v. Orleans Parish School Board,' the court struck down a program which
required teachers to submit a urine sample for a drug test after the occurrence of
an accident on campus. It held in this case that no "special needs" were present
because there was no evidence of drug abuse among the teachers in the parish.
"[S]pecial needs must rest on demonstrated realities. Failure to do so leaves the
effort to justify this testing as responsive to drugs in public schools as a 'kind of
immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use,' that
troubled Justice Scalia in Von Raab."' The court held that since no "special
needs" were present, the test could only be conducted based upon adequate
individualized suspicion of illegal drug use.
The Supreme Court has stated that a stronger argument for special needs can
be made by the government if it can show some evidence of drug abuse among the
individuals subject to testify. One of the bases for striking down the staute in
Chandler was that no evidence was offered to show that drug abuse was a problem
among candidates for state office. Evidence of drug use would have bolstered the
special needs argument advanced by the government in that case.6' To support this
63. JoeGyan, Jr, Judge Rules Drug-Testing Law Illegal, The Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.). Nov.
21, 1998, at IA.
64. La. R.S. 49:1021(A) (Supp. 1997).
65. 142 F.3d 853 (5th Cir. 1998).
66. Id. at 857 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656.681,109
S. Ct. 1384, 1399 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
67. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1303 (1997).
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argument in regard to the new drug testing statutes, the legislature should give
some indication of how prevalent the use of drugs is among the population it seeks
to test..
The government has offered no evidence of particularized drug use among any
of the groups covered by the new statutes. In a nationwide survey of 1,450 college
students and 1,420 individuals who had been out of high school for one to four
years but were not in college, it was reported that 33.5% of the college students had
used illegal drugs, while 34.0% of those non-students responding had used illegal
drugs.6" This shows that nationwide, there is no more of a drug problem among
college students than among non-students of the same age group. Therefore, the
government can form no individualized suspicion of those persons enrolled in
school versus those who are not.
Nor has the legislature given any indication of a problem with illegal drug
abuse among recipients of welfare benefits. In fact, in a national survey conducted
in December 1996, it was estimated that 5.0% of the general public used illegal
drugs, while that number was only slightly higher for welfare recipients at 7.0%.69
Is this increase enough to expose the welfare population to searches that the general
public would not be required to endure? Following the rationale of Chandler, if
the government cannot point to any individualized suspicion of drug use among the
population it seeks to test, then the government must offer some "special need" to
justify subjecting those persons to a search.
b. Safety-Sensitive Positions
The legislature has also stated that drug abuse among its citizens poses a
significant danger to the health, welfare and security of the citizens of the state. It
further noted that the economic costs of illegal drug abuse are paid by all citizens
of the state of Louisiana, through increased costs of law enforcement, higher prices
of goods and services due to low productivity in the workplace, and attempts to
rehabilitate drug abusers.70
Further, the legislature has stated that a safety sensitive issue is presented due
to the state or state entities entering into government contracts with persons who
use illegal drugs. Although it gives no specific examples of how the safety of the
public is implicated, the legislature said that if goods and services were to be
provided by illegal drug abusers, "the lives... of persons operating motor vehicles,
eating at public state facilities or receiving other goods and services from such
vendors" would be placed in jeopardy.7
In its most recent pronouncement on urinalysis drug testing, the Supreme
Court has explicitly stated that "[w]hen public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy,
68. National Institute on Drug Abuse Capsule-Monitoring the Future Study (visited Nov. 2,
1998) <http://www.health.org/pubs/caps/NCCollege.htm>.
69. Alcohol and Drug Behavior Among Welfare Recipients (visited Sept. 22, 1998)
<http'l/www.ndsn.org/DEC96/ WELFARE.htmI>.
70. La. R.S. 49:1021(A)(1) (Supp. 1997).
71. La. R.S. 49:1021(A)(2) (Supp. 1997).
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the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how
conveniently arranged."72 Therefore, absent some individualized suspicion, only
those government employees who occupy safety-sensitive positions can be subject
to the scrutiny of a urinalysis drug test. Those employees may include security
officers,73 prison employees," or public school custodians who are often in contact
with dangerous chemicals and children.75 Von Raab explicitly left open the
question of the reasonableness of testing employees who handle confidential
information. It remanded this question to determine whether these employees
would be handling information that was safety-sensitive. This decision seems to
reinforce the argument that unless the government employee occupies a position
that involves the safety of the public, it is a violation of his Fourth Amendment
right to subject him to a urinalysis drug test.
In Aubrey v. School Board of Lafayette Parish,76 the court upheld a program
designed to test persons employed in positions which were listed in a school board
regulation as "safety-sensitive." The plaintiff, Aubrey, was a custodian in the
school system, a position which was listed in the regulation as "safety-sensitive."
The court upheld the program based on a "special needs" analysis. It stated that
while the intrusiveness of the search was minimal, the interests of the government
in ensuring that those employees in a public school who interact regularly with
students, operate potentially dangerous equipment, and handle hazardous
chemicals, are free from impairment by illegal drug use was strong.' Furthermore,
the court held that when "safety-sensitive" positions are at issue, no evidence of
drug use in the district's schools was required to validate the reasonableness of the
search.78
Following Supreme Court precedent, as well as the analysis followed by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, it seems there are only two ways that Louisiana's
statutes may be saved. First, they may be limited only to those persons who hold
a safety-sensitive position. Second, Louisiana's statutes may be upheld if there is
evidence of a significant drug problem among the segment targeted for testing.
c. Lack of Triggering Mechanism
Present in Skinner and Von Raab, where drug testing programs were upheld,
was some sort of triggering mechanism which would put the employee on notice
that he could be required to undergo a drug test. In Skinner, that trigger was a
railroad accident, while in Von Raab, it was the application for promotion to a
safety-sensitive position. An additional flaw in the Louisiana statute is that there
72. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997).
73. See New Jersey Transit PBA Local 304 v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 675 A.2d 1180 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1996).
74. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Roberts, 9 F.3d 1464 (9th Cir. 1993).
75. See Aubrey v. School Bd. of Lafayette Parish, 148 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 1998).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 565.
78. Id. at 564.
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is no triggering mechanism that allows those persons who are covered to be put on
notice that they may be required to undergo a urinalysis test.
It may be argued that receiving things of economic value from the state
"triggers" the possibility that the recipient may be required to undergo a drug test.
However, as discussed above, some persons who may be subjected to the drug
testing procedures do not even know of the existence of the statutes, or do not
know that the statutes may apply to them. This differentiates the Louisiana statutes
from those upheld in Skinner and Von Raab.
d. "Set a Good Example"
Louisiana's governor has specifically stated that government employees,
especially those holding state office, should "set an example" for the rest of the
state.79 Chandler explicitly struck down a drug testing program that was based on
"symbolic" needs rather than "special" needs.'0  A need "of the 'set a good
example' genre" is not sufficient to overcome a Fourth Amendment objection."'
The Louisiana statute provides for the type of drug testing program that was
specifically struck down in Chandler as a violation of the candidates' Fourth
Amendment rights.
As justification for testing welfare recipients, the governor, an avid supporter
of the drug testing programs, stated that the drug testing of welfare recipients is to
prepare the recipients for the workforce, where they will likely be subject to the
same type of testing; therefore, aiding in the accomplishment of his overall goal of
getting people to work and off of welfare. " It has already been stated that a
"symbolic" need will not be sufficient to support the reasonableness of a
suspicionless drug test. 3 Therefore, Louisiana Revised Statutes 46:460.10, which
mandates drug testing of welfare recipients, likewise cannot survive constitutional
scrutiny.
4. Diminished Expectation of Privacy
The "special needs" analyses conducted in Skinner and Von Raab resulted in
the conclusion that government employees who occupy safety-sensitive positions
in industries heavily regulated by the government have a diminished expectation
of privacy; and therefore, the privacy interests implicated by the minimal intrusion
of a urinalysis test are far outweighed by the need for public safety. However,
Chandler specifically limited those cases to their unique contexts.8 It seems, then,
79. Telephone Interview with staff of Executive Counsel's Office, in Baton Rouge, La. (Oct. 11,
1998).
80. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997).
81. Id.
82. Telephone Interview with staff of Executive Counsel's Office, in Baton Rouge, La. (Oct. 11,
1998).
83. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322, 117 S. Ct. at 1305.
84. Id. at 321, 117 S. Ct. at 1304.
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that employees in government departments that are not heavily regulated have the
same expectation of privacy as anyone else, not diminished in any way.
Vernonia recognized that students who participated in interscholastic athletics
had a diminished expectation of privacy. It also held that a school is delegated the
authority to act in loco parentis when it is entrusted with the care of students.
However, this rationale cannot be relied upon to support the reasonableness of a
suspicionless drug test of students who receive financial aid, most of which are
college-aged and enrolled in institutions of higher education. The legislature
cannot use the in loco parentis reasoning to support an otherwise unreasonable
search in the context of college students, many of whom live away from home and
are presumed to be independent and responsible. It has long been held that
students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door. 5 Students
enrolled in colleges, even those who live in on-campus dormitories, enjoy the usual
privacy rights enjoyed by adults.86
C. Summary
All of the interests that the government hopes to advance cannot sufficiently
outweigh the privacy interests of the persons who will be subjected to the drug
testing scheme. Those people should not be subjected to an indignity such as a
urine test simply because they receive things of economic value from the state or
a state entity. They should not be treated any differently from the rest of the
general public.
V. CONCLUSION
The filing of a suit challenging Louisiana's mandatory drug testing statutes
was inevitable given the constitutional inadequacies of the statutes enacted by the
legislature. Other challenges brought against Louisiana's drug testing provisions
will succeed as well, as courts will undoubtedly follow the lead of the Eastern
District in O'Neill v. State of Louisiana. As a result of those challenges, the
legislature will be required to refine the application of the statutes to apply only to
those individuals who are involved in safety-sensitive activities or where some
indication of drug abuse among the population to be tested is recognized.
Louisiana's drug testing statutes are unconstitutional as a violation of the
Fourth Amendment's guarantee of protection against unreasonable searches.
Searches under those provisions must be based on probable cause. In cases where
it would be impractical to require probable cause, the search must nevertheless be
based on some individualized suspicion of wrongdoing unless there are special
circumstances. The government has given no indication that such circumstances
85. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506. 89 S. Ct. 733,
736(1969).
86. See Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp 777, 790 (W.D. Mich. 1975) and Devers v. Southern
Univ., 712 So. 2d 199, 206 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998).
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are present in Louisiana. Nevertheless, a suspicionless search may still be
reasonable when the government's interests in conducting the search outweigh the
privacy interests of the individual that are implicated by such a search. In
promulgating these statutes, the Louisiana Legislature has not given any safety
reasons that would justify the search in question. Nor has it shown any evidence
of a drug problem among the population to be tested. Furthermore, the statutes are
overbroad in that almost every person in the State of Louisiana may be required to
submit a urine sample for testing. Such broad statutes surely cannot survive a
constitutional challenge. Although a drug crisis may exist in the State of Louisiana,
"society's fundamental right to be protected against unreasonable searches and
seizures should not be sacrificed in the name of our country's war against drugs."'
Louisiana's governor believes that state employees should "set a good
example" for the rest of the state by submitting to drug tests. The judicial system
of Louisiana should do the same by striking down these drug testing provisions,
and thereby protecting the right guaranteed to citizens of the United States to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Tina L. Wilson'
87. Christine A. Atkinson, Note, Mandatory Drug Testing in the Public Work Sector: Erosion
of Fourth Amendment Protections, 12 U. Bridgeport L Rev. 293 (1991).
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